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Uruguay loses between $17 million and $35 million a year by
protecting its automobile industry. Uruguayan consumers lose
between $70 billion and $80 billion a  year on automobiles,
transferring $36 million to $44 million to domestic assembly
operations and components manufacturers.
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Domestic  content  requirements  are regulations  Higher  finished  vehicle  priicCs  encourauc
that mandate  minimum  percentages  of domestic  more output  from  domestic  assembly  operations,
value-added,  or domestic  componenits  for  but domestic  contcnt  and compensatory  expori
products  sold within  lhe country,  or provide  requirements  discouragc  domestic  assembly.
strong  incentives  to substitute  domestic  lor  The  net effect  could  eitlhe  encouraige or discour-
imported  inputs.  age domestic  assembly  operations,  depending  on
the net impact  of the  regulations.  In Uruguay,  the
Australia,  Canada,  and  many Latin  American  effect  is to encourage  domestic  asseimibly.
countries  have used  regulations  of this type  to
foster a domestic  motor  vehlicle industry.  The  Part of the consumer  loss flriom  higher  priccs
result  is often domestic  assembly  operations  that  represents  a tranlsfer to the assembly  industry;
import  "kits"  or sets of components  from abroad  part a transfer  to the domestic  componiciits
and combine  them  with domestically  produced  manufacturers;  and  part is an el'l'iciency  loss
components  to produce  a finished  vellicle.  because  domestic  production  anid assembly  is
Some countries  superimposed  export promotion  costlier  than domestic  productioni and assembly
policies  on these domestic  content  requirements.  on the  world  market.
Takacs  developed  a model  to investigate  the  Trade  in this  industry  shiould be liberalized.
distortions,  costs,  and  transfers  among  groups  It would  be possibie  to do so gradually  witlinii
caused  by the combination  of domestic  content  the framework  o'  thie curretll proteCtive  Iegitlim.
and compensatory  export  requirements.  She  Care should  be taken not to inadveiteiitly  in-
applied  that model  to the protection  scheme  for  crease  effective  protection  of' the  assembly
Uruguay's  automobile  industry.  industry  by,  for example,  pilhlSilg Oul (domestic
content  and compensatory  expoit  requirements
She  found  that  the protective  regime keeps  on kits  faster  than those  on finished  autos  - ihus
vehicle  prices  and domestic  production  costs  temporarily  encouraging  domestic  assembly.
high and transfers  large sums  to special  interest
groups.
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This  paper  was  prepared  as  background  material  for  the  joint  UNDP/World
Bank  Trade  Expansion  Program  which  provides  technical  and  policy  advice  to
countries  wishing  to reform  their  trade  regimes. The  views  are  those  of the
author,  not those  of the  United  Nations  or of  the  World  Bank. The  author
would  like  to thank  Bela  Balassa,  Irwin  Baskind,  Michael  Connolly  and  Jaime  de
Melo  for  helpful  comments  on a  previous  draft,  and  Elbio  Nattino  Aldabe  for
help in  obtaining  the  data.I.  INTRODUCTION
Domestic content requirements are regulations that mandate minimum
percentages of domestic value-added, or domestic components for products sold
within the country, or provide strong incentives to substitute domestic for
imported inputs.  Many Latin American countries, Canada, and Australia'  have
used regulations of this type as part of import-substitution  industrialization
strategies to foster a domestic motor vehicle industry.  These protective
regimes often resulted in domestic assembly operations that import "kits", or
sets of components from abroad, and combine them with domestically produced
components to put together a finished  vehicle.
As the limits of import substitution industrialization  were reached, and
interest shifted toward export promotion, many countries superimposed export
promotion policies on the underlying domestic content requirements.  Brazil
(and for a time Argentina) offered tax exemptions and waiver of import deposit
requirements if certain amounts of output were exported.'  For a period of
time Argentina linked approval for expansion of domestic output to fulfillment
of quantitative export targets.
3 In other countries, such as Mexico'  and
Uruguay'  export promotion took the form of more explicit "compensatory export
requirements"  which are required exports of automobile industry products equal
to specified percentages of the value of imported  kits or finished vehicles.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model to investigate the
distortions, costs, and transfers among groups caused by the combination of
domestic content and this last form of export promotion, compensatory export
requirements.  The model is then applied to make some rough estimates of the2
order  v  magnitude  of the  costs  and  transfers  arising  from  the  Uruguayan
automobile  industry  protection  scheme.
II. A MODEL  OF DOMESTIC  CONTENT  AND COMPENSATORY  EXPORT  REQUIREMENTS
This section  develops  a model  to assess  the  major  impacts  of the
domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  and  the interaction
between  them. The  model  simplifies  by ignoring  differentiation  among  types  of
components,  the  trade-off  between  domestic  content  and  compensatorY  exports,
regulations  on  minimum  disassembly  of components  in  kits,  and  prohibitions
against  importing  certain  components.  The  model  also  assumes  a small
importing  count.y  with  competitive  components  and  assembly  industries,  and
assumes  that  the  domestic  content  requirements  and  all  compensatory  export
requirements  are  binding  (that  is,  less  domestic  content  would  be used  by
assembly  firms  if there  were  no domestic  content  requirements,  and  exports  of
components  would  be less  than  the  observed  values  in the  absence  of
compensatory  export  requirements)  '
Suppose  that  the  country  imposing  the  domestic  content  and  compensatory
export  requirements  is small,  so that  the  world  price,  or import  price,  of
assembled  autos  (PA*)  and  of auto  components  (Pc*)  are  both given. Assume
that there  is  only  one type  of finished  or  assembled  automobile,  made  through
a process  of assembling  a given  number,  "all  of components.'  For  the  moment,
ignore  differences  among  components.  A perfectly  competitive  domestic
components  industry  manufactures  components  and  a perfectly  competitive
domestic  industry  assembles  autos  from  imported  and  domestically  produced
components. Finished  autos  can  be imported,  subject  to compensatory  export3
requirements.  The  domestic  assembly  industry  is  subject  to  domest  o  content
requirements  and  compensatory  export  requirements  for  a package  of imported
components,  called  a "kit". Equilibrium  prices  and  quantities  in  the  market
for  assembled  autos  and  in the  market  for  components  will  be determined
jointly  because  they  are tied  cogether  not  only  by the  normal  input-output
relationships,  but  also  by the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export
requirements.
The  Domestic  Market  for  Assembled  Autos
Importation  of assembled  autos  requires  compensatory  exports  of xv  of
the  value  of the  imported  auto.  (If  compensatory  exports  equal  to 50%  of the
value  of the  imported  auto  are  required,  then  xA-0.5.)  The  value  of
compensatory  exports  required  per  auto  would  be xPA*-Pcqc  where  qc  is the
quantity  of components  that  must  be exported  per imported  finished  auto.  If
these  components  sell  in the  world  market  at Pc*,  the  cost  to the  firm  of the
required  compensatory  exports  would  be (Pc-Pc*)qc  - ((Pc-Pc*)/Pc)xAPA*.  An ad
valorem  tariff  rate  of tA  on autos  in  addition  to  the  compensatory  export
requirements,  will increase  the  cost  of the  imported  vehicle  by the  amount  of
the  duty.  Thus  the  cost  of an imported  auto  will  be PA*(l+tA)  +  x,((PC-
Pc*)  /PC)  PA*  -
Given  that  in  the  long  run  a perfectly  competitive  industry  would  be
expected  to  make  zero  economic  profits,  in  the  long  run  the  total  cost  of the
imported  assembled  vehicle  equals  price,  so:
PA*(l+tk+XA(Pc-PC*)/PC))  - P(1)
where  P&  and  Pc  are  the  domestic  prices  of assembled  vehicles  and  components,
respectively.  The  last  equality  results  from  the  long-run  zero  profit4
condicion  for  a perfectly  competitive  industry. Given  the  world  prices  of
assembled  autos  .id  components  and  the  price  of domestic  components,  (1)
determines  the  domestic  market  price  of assembled  autos. Given  that  price,
the  quantity  of assembled  autos  sold  (domestically  assembled  from  kits  and
domestic  components  plus imported  already  assembled)  will  be determined  by the
domestic  demand  for  finished  autos:
D(PA)  - MA +  QA  (2)
Suppose  that  there  is  an upward  sloping  supply  function  of value-added
in domestic  assembly  operations,  in  which  the  quantity  of autos  firms  are
willing  to assemble  increases  as the  value-added  per  unit (VA)  increases,  as
in (3):
VA  - V (QW)  V' positive  (3)
where  Q 1 is the  quantitv  of finished  autos  produced. Suppose  that  the
assembly  technology  requires  a  certain  number  of components,  "a"  per  auto.  Let
"6"  be the  proportion  of total  components  that  must  be of domestic  origin. 8
If 20  percent  domestic  content  is required,  then  6-0.2. Let  x1 be the
compensatory  export  requirement  for  kits,  that  is,  the  proportion  of the  value
of the imported  kit that  must  be compensatLed  by exports  of auto industry
products. Then  a(l-6)Pc*  is the  value  of a  kit  at world  market  prices. Given
the  compensatory  export  requirements,  the  value  of compensatory  exports
required  to import  the  kit  would  be xga(1-6)Pc*-Pcqc,  where  qc  is the  quantity
of compensatory  exports  required  to import  one  kit. The tariff  on kits  would
increase  the  cost  of kits  to the  domestic  assembly  industry  by the  tariff
revenue  that  would  have to  be paid  per  kit,  or a(l-S)Pc*t&.  The  cost  of
domestic  components  would  equal  a6Pc. The  assumption  of a perfectly5
competitive  assembly  'adustry  implies  that  in the  long-run  unit  cost  equals
price,  so:
PA  - a(l-6)Pc*(l+tK+c*(Pc-Pc*)/Pc)  + asPc  + V(QC)  (4)
Equation  (4)  can  be thought  of  as the  lor  ,-run  assembly  industry  inverse
supply  curve. It is  constructed  by adding  vertically  the  domestic  value-added
that  would  be required  for  firms  to  be willing  to assemble  various  quantities
of  vehicles,  the  cost  per  vehicle  of  domestic  components  used  as intermediate
inputs  (aSPc)  and  the  effective  cost  of the  imported  kit  which  would  equal
a(l- 6)Pc*(l+tA+xK(Pc-Pc*)/Pc).  Equations  (l)-(4)  determine  PA,  MA,  (A,  and  DA,
given  Pc,  PA*,  Pc*  tA,  tK, xA,  xK, a  and  6.  The  market  for  assembled  autos  is
depicted  graphically  in the  upper  quadrant  of Figure  1.
The  price  of autos  to  consumers  would  be PA. This lies  above  the  world
price  of PA*  by an amount  equal  to the  extra  costs  imposed  by the  tariff
(tAPA*)  and  compensatory  export  requirements  on assembled  autos  (xA((Pc-
PC*)/PC)PA*).  At this  price,  consumers  would  demand  DA  vehicles.
The supply  curve  of the  domestic  assembly  operations  is  shown  in  Figure
I  by SA. As explained  in  more  detail  in the  sectton  on the  costs  of
protection  below,  SA  is the  vertical  sum  of the  supply  curve  under  free  trade
(SA*),  the  increase  in  assembly  industry  costs  per  veh4cle  due to the  tariff
(a(l-S)Pc*tK),  and  the  increase  in  costs  attributable  to the  domestic  content
and  compensatory  export  requirements  (a6(Pc-Pc*)+a(1-6)x(Pc-Pc*)Pc*/Pc)
At a price  of Pi,  the  domestic  industry  would  produce  QA. The  difference
between  the  quantity  demanded  and  supplied  would  be the  quantity  imported,  MA.
The  various  elements  of the  protective  regime  influence  the  market  for
assembled  vehicles  in  potentially  contradictory  ways.  The  compensatory  export6
requirements  for  the  importation  of assembled  -3hicles  and the  tariff  on
assembled  vehicles  drive  up importer  costs,  and  thus  increase  the  price  of the
finished  vehicle  to  the  consumer. Higher  finished  vehicle  prices  encourage
greater  output  from  domestic  assembly  operations,  but on the  other  hand the
domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  for  kits  and the  tariff
on kits  discourage  domestic  assembly  operations  by increasing  input  costs.
This shows  up as an  upward  shift  in  the  supply  curve  for  vehicles  assembled
within  the  country.
The  Domestic  Market  for  Components
Assume  that  the  perfectly  competitive  domestic  components  industry  has  a
supply  curve  for  components,  given  in inverse  form  by:
Pc  - S(Qc)  S'  positive  (5)
where  Qc  is the  quantity  of  components  supplied  by the  domestic  industry.
The  demand  for  domestic  components  arises  from  three  sources: 1)  the  demand
for  components  to  be combined  with imported  kits  for  domestic  assembly  (a6QS);
2)  exports  of components  as compensatory  exports  for  the  importation  of kits
(Xi);  and  3) exports  of components  as compensatory  exports  for  the  importation
of assembled  vehicles  (XA).  Thus:
Qc  - X'  + Xt  + a6QA  (6)
Given  the  compensatory  export  requirements,  PcXA  - xAPA*MA  and  PcXK  -
xKa(l-6)Pc*QA,  so (6)  can  also  be expressed  as:
Qc  - xAML(PA*/PC)  + xKa(l-S)QA(Pc*/Pc)  + a6QA  (7)
Equation  (7)  can  be thought  of as the  demand  curve  for  domestic  components.
Equations  (5)  and (7)  determine  Pc  and  Qc,  given  QA,  Pj*,  Pc*,  xv,  xi,  a, and  6.7
The equilibrium in the market for components is  depicted graphically in the
lower  quadrant of Figure 1.
The supply curve of the domestic components industry is shown by Sc.
The demand curve for components, Dc, is the horizontal sum cE the demand for
components by domestic assemblers (Dd,)
9, the demand for components for export
to satisfy compensatory export requirements for imported  kits (D"), and the
demand for components to satisfy compensatory export requirements to import
assembled venicles (D,).
Equilibrium in the components market would occur at the price/quantity
combination Pc  and Qc.  Under free trade, domestic producers would be forced
to match the world market price of components Pc*,  at which price compor.nts
production would be Qc*.  The domestic content and compensatory export
requirements all act to increase the demand for components produced within the
country, driving up price and production.
Given the linkages between the  markets for domestic components and
assembled vehicles, equations (l)-(5)  and (7) jointly determine the endogenous
variables P,.  Pc,  D,,  M,.  Q,  and Qc  given the world market prices P,*  and Pc*
and  the policy  parameters  tA, t..,  xA, xI, a, and  6.  The  equilibrium  prices  and
quantities in both markets would be determined simultaneously.
III.  TRANSFERS AMONG GROUPS tI/;D  NET COST OF THE PROTECTIVE REGIME
If there were no protective regime, and abstracting from transportation
costs, the world market prices of both assembled autos and components would
prevail within the respective domestic markets.  In the components market, a
quantity Qc*  would be produced at the price Pc*.  The domestic assembly8
operations  would  have access  to  components  at this  price,  so their  supply
curve  would  be the  vertical  sum  of  the  value-added  per  unit required  for  each
output  level  and  the  cost  of component  inputs,  ciPc*.  This  supply  curve  is
shown  by  SA* in the  top  quadrant  of Figure  1.  At the  free-trade  price  P,*,
the  domestic  industry  would  assemble  QA*  units,  consumers  would  purchase  DA*
units,  so  M.*  assembled  vehicles  would  be imported.
The costs  of the  entire  protective  regime  can  b  assessed  using  the
free-trade  equilibriu.m  as a benchmark  for  comparison.  The  domestic  content
requirements  and  compensatory  export  requirements  for  the  importation  of kits
increase  input  costs  to  assewiiiers,  and  th.s  shift  their  supply  curve  upward
to SA'. The  size  of the  upward  shift  is  a6(Pc-Pc*)+a(i-6)x,(Pc-Pc*)Pc*/Pc,  equal
to the  distance  yl in  Figure  1.  The tariff  on  kits  shifts  the  supply  curve
upward  by an  amount  equal  to  a(l-6)Pc*tt,  which  is  represented  in  Figure  1  by
the  distance  by.  The  domestic  content  requirements,  compensatory  export
requirements,  and tariff  taken  together  shift  the  assembler's  supply  curve
from SA*  to Se.
The  welfare  costs  can  be measured  as the  effects  of distortions  in  the
markets  for  assembled  vehicles  and  components.  The  cost to  consumers  of the
restrictions  is  area  adek,  the  reduction  in  consumer  surplus  as compared  to
free  trade. Of this,  area  def  is the  traditional  deadweight  loss  in
consumption  due  to  higher  assembled  auto  prices.
Area  bdfh resembles  tariff-equivalent  revenue,  in that  the  height  of the
rectangle  is the  difference  between  -3estic  and import  price  and  the  width  is
the  number  of  vehicles  imported  fully  assembled.  Of this,  however,  only  area
bdwx represents  tariff  revenue  collected  on imported  vehicles. The  distance9
wf can  be thought  of as the implicit  tariff  on assembled  autos  imposed  by the
conpensatory  export  requirements.  Area  xwfh  represents  the  "tariff  equivalent
revenue"  associated  with the  increase  in importers'  costs because  of the
compensatory  export  requirements.  This  area is  part  transfer  to  domestic
comnponents  manuifacturers  and  part deadweight  loss  due  to increased  relatively
high  cost  production  in the  domestic  components  industry. The  nature  of the
transfer  and loss  can  be seen  by noting  that  area  xwfh  equals  area  pqrs in  the
lower  quadrant  of Figure  1'°,  which  is  composed  of the  extra  cost  of producing
pq units  of components  within  the  country  rather  than  importing  them  (the  area
under  the  components  supply  curve  above  the  world  market  price  Pc*),  and  area
pqv,  which is  a transfer  in  the  form  of  higher  short-run  profits  to components
manufacturers  for  the  extra  output  pq (-axKM,).  Area  pqrs also  can  be thought
of as the  value  o£ the  subsidy  to  con ,onents  exports  generated  by the
compensatory  export  requirements  on finished  autos. It represents  the
dif'-erence  between  domestic  and  world  market  components  prices  (qr)  times  the
quantity  of compensatory  exports  needed  to allow  vehicle  imports  (pq). This
export  subsidy  is  a transfer  from  domestic  consumers  to components  exporters,
using  vehicle  importers  as intermediaries.
The  compensatory  export  requirements  for  kits  and  the  domestic  content
requirements  shift  up the  assembler's  supply  curve  from  SA to  SA'  (-yl),  so,
at the  resulting  domestic  Level  of assembly  operations  CA,  area  zyln
represents  the  extra  cost  of  components  to assemblers  becea12e  of the  existence
of these  restrictions.  The increased  cost  to domestic  assemblers  of area  zyln
is in  part  a transfer  to  domestic  manufacturers  of components  and in  part  a
deadweight  efficiency  loss. To see  how  the  area  is  divided,  note that  area10
zyln in the upper quadrant of Figure 1 equals area opsu in the lower quadrant
of the same diagram."  Area opvtu represents a transfer to the domestic
components manufacturers in the form of higher profits, and area vst
represents a ceadweight loss due to the excess of production costs
domestically over the price at which the components could have been purchased
in the world market, for the extra output op produced because of the domestic
content requirements and the compensatory export requirements for kits.  Area
cpsg can be thought of as the value of the subsidy to components exports due
to the compensatory export requirements for kit imports.  It is in essence a
transfer from domestic consumers to components exporters, using assemblers as
intermediaries.12
Area nlik represents an increase in profits to domestic assembly
operations due to the net effect of the entire protective regime.  Area lhi
represents a production deadweight loss, the extra cost of assembling QA-QA*
vehicles within the country rather than buying them in the  world market at
PA*.
To summarize the net welfare effect of all of the restrictive measures
taken together, the regime imposes losses on consumers equal to area adek, of
which nlik represents a transfer to domestic assemblers of autos, abyz a
transfer to the government in the form of tariff revenue on kits, zyln
represents a transfer to domestic components manufacturers (equal to area
opvtu) plus deadweight production loss (equal  to area vst), def is a
deadweight loss due to the consumption distortion in the market for assembled
autos, lhi is a deadweight production loss due to high-cost assembly of autos
domestically, bdwx is tariff revenue on autos, and xwfh represents a loss to
consumers that is in part transfered to components manufacturers (area  pqv)11
and in  part deadweight loss (area  qrsv).  The net effect, ignoring transfers,
is a consumption loss of def, and production deadweight losses of Ihi and qrt
in the assembly and components industries, respectively.
The transfers from consumers to  both the domestic assombly and the
domestic components industry show that  both assemblers and manufacturers of
components can gain from the protective regime,  but in some respects their
interests are contradictory.  From the point of view of the manufacturers of
domestic components, the more restrictive the domestic content requirements
and both compensatory export requirements, the greater their gains.  From the
point of view of the domestic assembly industry, the more demanding the
compensatory export requirements for assembled autos (the  higher xA,  holding 6
and xr  constant), the greater their gains.  However, holding constant the
compensatory export requirement for assembled autos (xj),  the more restrictive
the domestic content requirement (the  higiler  6) and the more severe the
compensatory export requirements for kits (the  higher x1), the smaller will be
the gains to domestic assembly operations.  Note that the assemblers need not
necessarily gain on balance from the regime.  Sufficiently high 6 and xR
relative to x,  could leave the domestic assemblers  with a net loss and, on
balance, discourage rather than encourage domestic assembly of automobiles.
In light of this analysis it is  not surprising that the domestic assemblers
are arguing that the compensatory export requirements for assembled vehicles
are low relative to those for kits."
IV.  CALCULATION OF TRANSFERS AND COSTS IN  URUGUAY
The protective regime for the Uruguayan motor vehicle sector is  made up
of a combination of tariffs on imported  vehicles and parts, domestic content12
requirements  for  domestic  assembly  operations,  and  compensatory  export
requirements  for  both imported  vehicles  and  components  for  domestic  assembiy.
To import  fully  assembled  vehicles  firms  pay  a tariff  of  40 per  cent,  and  must
export  automobile  industry  products  with  a value  added  in  Uruguay  equal  to 70
percent  of the  FOB  value  of the  imported  vehicle. In general,  the  exports
must take  place  before  the  new  vehicle  can  be imported.
To import  kits firms  must  pay  a tariff  of 10 percent  and  comply  with
both  domestic  content  requirements  and  compensatory  exports  provisions. The
domestic  content  requirements  for  assembly  of passenger  vehicles  from  kits
mandate  that  a minimum  of 20%  of the  value  of the  product  must  be of national
origin. With the  minimum  20%  domestic  content,  compensatory  exports  of 60%  of
the  FOB  value  of the  kit  are  required. A tradeoff  of domestic  content  for
compensatory  exports  is  allowed  at a ratio  of 1 to  2, that  is,  for  each
percentage  point  of domestic  content  added,  the  compensatory  exports  required
fall  by 2  percentage  points. For  example,  compensatory  exports  can  decrease
to 50%  if  domestic  content  is  increased  to 25%."
Observers  of the  automobile  industry  in  Uruguay  and  the  compensatory
export  system  report  that  a "market"  has  developed  in the  credits  for
compensatory  exports. Firms  assembling  vehicles  domestically  that  must  have
compensatory  exports  to import  kits  pay  exporters  of  parts  to  credit  the
exports  to  their  names. Different  observers  report  that  the  premium  paid  by
firms  to  have exports  credited  to  them  normally  varies  from  5 to 15  percent  of
the  value  of the invoices,  with  a average  of about  8 percent,  but  has  reached
as high  as 30  percent  in  times  of  very  high  domestic  demand.
The  magnitude  of the  areas  in  Figure  1 identified  above  as net  welfare
losses  and transfers  can  be calculated  based  on the  actual  values  of the13
policy  ."¶ameters  tA, tc,  and  x,,  the  average  values  of x 1 and  6  chosen  by
assembly  operations,  given  the  available  trade-off,  and  observed  values  of
prices,  quantities,  and  premia  paid  for  export  invoices  for  compensatory
exports.
The  consumer  loss  is  area  adek in  Figure  1.  Let  xf(Pc-Pc*)/Pc  be the
premium  paid  for invoices  to  be credited  as compensatory  exports,  and  "DA  be
the  elasticity  of demand  for  assembled  vehicles. Then,  given  that
(PA-PA*)  - Pk*(ttA^xAXA)  and (DA*-DA)  - ?hA  (Dd/PA)PA*(tA+x&ff),
Area adek  - (PA-PA*)DA  +l/2(PA-P*)(DA*-DA)
- PA*(tA+xAW)(D,+l/2(D,*-DA))
- PA*DA(tA+xAl)(l+l/ 2 ,D(tA+xAr))  (8)
The  deadweight  loss in  consumption,  area  def,  would  be:
Area  def  - l/2(PA*(t,+xAlr))(DA*-DA)
- l/2(PA*(t,+x,ff) 2i7DAD/P,
- l/2PA,*DA(tA+xAn)2,  (9)
The  gain to the  assembly  industry  (area  nlik)  and  the  deadweight  loss to
the  economy  from  excess  assembly  operations  (area  lhi)  can  be calculated  by
first  noting  that  the  height  of  each  of these  areas equals  the  net impact  of
the  restrictive  regime,  that  is,  the  amount,  net of  cost increases,  by  which
revenue  per  unit  exceeds  free-trade  revenue. Let  this  distance  (nk-lh)  be
designated  N:
N - PA*tL + xArPA* a(l-6)tiPc*  -a67Pc  -a(l-6)xKPc*
Let  a  - aPc*/PL*  be the  share  of components  production  in  the  final  cost  of a
finished  vehicle. Then:
N - P,*(t,+x,  aG((1-6)(tI+xff)+6r/(l1-r)))-14
Let the elasticity of the supply of  vehicle assembly with respect to
value added be eS,, and note that (QA-QA*)  - eSA(QA/(PA*.,))N.  Then,
Area  lhi  - 1/2 (PA*(  t+XAw)-PC*a(1-6)(tK+Xf+aS))(QA-QA*)
- 1/2 N2ESAQA  W(PA*+N).  (10)
The gain to the assembly industry, area nlik, can be calculated as area
nlhk less area Ihi, or:
Area nlik - QA N - 1/2 N 2 ESA QA/(PA*(l+xAf,  (11)
Let esc  be the elasticity of supply of components, and Vc-PcQc  be the value of
domestic components production.  The deadweight loss from excess production in
the components industry is shown in Figure 1 as area qrt.
Area qrt - 1/2(Pc-Pc*)(Qc-Qc*)
- l/ 2iTPcesc(Qc/Pc)iPc
- 1/2 Vcsc Xr  (12)
The transfer to the domestic components industry as a result of the protective
regime is area oqtu, which equals area oqru less the deadweight loss:
Area oqtu - (Pc-Pc*)Qc  - 1/2 VCCSCX 2 - VCf - 1/2  Vcescx 2. (13)
Application of the model to the Uruguayan protective regime requires
data on quantities assembled, sales, import price of assembled-vehicles,
deviation of components prices from  world prices, the ratio of components cost
to the final price of a finished  vehicle, and the  value of components
production. The data used for the  variables that appear in the above equations
are:15
DATA  USED  IN CALCULATIONS  OF IMPACT  OF
DOMESTIC  CONTENT  AND COMPENSATORY  EXPORT  REOUIREMENTS
Variable  Value  Measure  and (Source)
?f  0.08  Percentage  of value  of invoice  paid to  exporter  of
components  for  invoices  to  be credited  for  purposes  of
fulfilling  compensatory  export  requirements (Verbal
estimates  of individuals  interviewed)
tA  0.561  Price  increasing  effect  of the  40 percent  tariff  on
assembled  automobiles,  taking  into  account  that  the
tariff-inclusive  price  is the  base for  the  internal
tax (impuesto  especifico  interno)  of 15  percent  and
the  tax-inclusive  price  is  the  base for  the  22  percent
value-added  tax: t,  - .40(l.15)(1.22)
cK  0.165  Price-increasing  effect  of tariff  of 10  percent  on
kits,  which  only  applies  to approximately  14 percent
of imported  kits (because  imports  from  Brazil  and
Argentina  are  exempt  from  duty  under  bilateral  trading
arrangements),  taking  into  account  that  kits  are
subject  to an internal  tax  of 12  percent  and  a 22
percent  value-added  tax:
t5  - 0.14(. 1)( 1 .l 2 )( 1 .2 2 )+1 2 (1 .22 )L5
x,  0.70  Compensatory  export  requirement  for  assembled  vehicles
xK  0.53  Ratio  of compensatory  exports  to  kit imports  chosen  by
firms  (based  on  data from  2 firms  representing  27%  of
the  market)
6  0.235  Average  domestic  content  ratio  chosen  by domestic
assembly  firms  (based  on data  from  2 firms
representing  27%  of the  market)
PA*  US$8086  Unit  Value  of imported  assembled  vehicles  (1989)
Categories  A, C, D, E, and  H (Camara  de Fabricantes  de
Automotores)
QA  11,690  Number  of  vehicles  assembled  in  Uruguay  (1989)
Categories  A, C,  D, E, and  H (Camara  de Fabricantes  de
Automotores)
QD  12,237  Number  of  vehicles  sold  in  Uruguay  (1989) (Calculated
aS Q0  plus 529  assembled  vehicles  imported)
o  0.621  Share  of components  cost  in final  cost  of assembled
vehicle  (weighted  average  of data  on costs  of  domestic16
components and kits as a share of final sales prices
for 4 Uruguayan assembly firms representing 70-80
percent of the industry,  using 1989 units assembled as
weights)
Vc  Value of components production (Calculated  within the
program as: 0.53(value of kit imports) + 0.7(value of
finished vehicle imports) + 0.235(value of assembled
vehicles sales (-CQPA*)
Tentative estimates of the magnitude of the  welfare effects of the
protective regime were calculated using equations 9 through 13, the above
data, and assumed combinations of elasticities of demand of -0.5  and -1.0 and
elasticities of supply of 1.0 and 2.0.
Table 1 presents the estimates of the magnitude of the loss to  buyers of
vehicles, the transfers to the domestic assembly and components industries,
and the efficiency losses, or net costs, of the protective regime.  In the
market for vehicles, the results indicate  a loss to buyers of vehicles of 70
to 80 million US dollars per year, depending upon the assumed elasticities.
The estimated transfer from  buyers of vehicles to the domestic assembly
industry ranges from 32 to 40 million US dollars, and the efficiency losses in
the assembled vehicles market range from 17 to 35 million.  In the components
market, the estimated transfer to producers is  between about 4.5 million US
dollars, while the estimated efficiency loss varies between 0.2 and 0.4
million.  These last estimates seem small, and are probably underestimated,
for reasons explained  below.
The estimates should be considered illustrative  and tentative for a
number of reasons:
1.  They are based on  a range of assumed elasticities of demand
for automobiles in the  Uruguayan market, and assumed elasticities of
supply of components and assembled  vehicles by Uruguayan producers.17
While  these  elasticities  are  reasonably  close  to those  estimated  for
other  markpts,  and  are  similar  to  elasticities  frequently  assumed  in'the
absence  of actual  estimates,  they  are  not  based  on elasticities
estimated  on the  basis  of  Uruguayan  data.
2.  The  range  of  values  for  the  percentage  of the  invoice  value
paid  to domestic  componencs  manufacturers  for  invoices  is  based  on
verbal  estimates  of individuals  familiar  with  the  industry  or involved
with  the  administration  of the  system,  rather  than  actual  observed  data.
3.  The  model  assumes  a homogeneous  output  ("assembled  auto")  and
a  homogeneous  input  ("components").  This is  an  obvious
oversimplification,  which  biases  the  estimates  of the  protection  and
transfers  to the  assembled  vehicle  sector  upward  and  those  to the
components  industry  downward. The  overestimate  of protection  to
assembled  vehicles  arises  because  the  models  that  are imported  fully
assembled  tend  to  be more luxurious  and  expensive  than  those  assembled
in  Uruguay. The loss  to  consumers  is  based  on  percentage  price
increases  using  this  average  import  price  as the  base.  The
underestimate  of the  degree  of  protection  and  transfers  to the
components  industry  arises  because  those  components  exported  will  tend
to  be those  that  are  most  competitive  on the  world  market. The  premium
on export  invoices  is thus  the  premium  necessary  to allow  exportation  of
the  most  competitive  components.  The  deviation  of domestic  price  from
world  market  price  for  the  least  competitive  components  is  undoubtedly
much larger.
3.  Distortions  due to the  preferential  trading  arrangements  with
Argentina  and  Brazil  also  bias downward  the  magnitude  of the  transfer  to18
th  domestic  components  industry  and  the  efficiency  losses  caused  by the
domestic  content  requlcements.  The impact  of the  regime  on the
components  industry  is  very  sensitive  to  variation-  in the  size  of che
deviation  of domestic  components  prices  from  world  prices. This
deviation  is  measured  in this  model  by the  percentage  premium  paid  by
importers  of assembled  vehicles  and  kits  for  export  invoices  to credit
toward  their  compensatory  export  requirements.  To the  extent  that
comper.satory  exports  are  shipped  to the  protected  markets  of Brazil  and
Argentina  under  preferential  trading  arrangements  rather  than  to the
world  market,  the  estimated  average  premium  will  be less  than  that  which
would  be necessary  to  ship  to the  world  market. This is  not  a  problem
with  respect  to measurirg  the  cost  imposed  upon  Uruguayan  auto  buyers  by
the  compensatory  export  requirements.  (It  does,  however,  lead  to the
observation  that  in  the  absence  of the  preferential  trading
arrangements,  the  costs  of the  regime  could  be much  higher,  because
compensatory  exports  would  have  to receive  an implicit  subsidy  high
enough  to  make  them  competitive  in  the  world  market"E.)  The  effect  of
the  domestic  content  requirements  will  be underestimated,  however,
because  the  relevant  price  differential  in that  case is  the  difference
between  world  market  and  domestic  prices  which  is  underestimated  by the
premium  paid  for  export  invoices. Given  that  the  estimates  of the
transfers  to the  components  industry  and  the  efficiency  losses  from
protected  components  production  are  very  sensitive  to this  parameter,
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  method  applied  here  yields  estimates
of the  degree  of protection  to the  components  industry  that  are  biased
downward,  perhaps  significantly.19
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The automobile protective regime in  Uruguay is made up of a complicated
set  of regulations.  Import; of both vehicles and components are subject to
tariffs.  Firms are constrained with respect to the number of models produced,
the number of vehicles per model, and the amounts of imported versus domestic
components used and must export automobile industry products equal to given
percentages of the value of kits and assembled vehicles imported.
The model developed to analyze the impact of the protective regime
indicates that domestic content requirements, compensatory export
requirements, and tariffs on finished  vehicles and kits keep vehicle prices
high, maintain high-cost domestic production of both vehicles and components,
and transfer large sums to special interest groups.
Compensatory export requirements and tariffs drive up the price of
finished  vehicles to consumers.  The consumer loss is in part a transfer to
the domestic producers in both the assembly and components industries in the
form of higi.  r profits, and in part efficiency losses, or net losses, due to
the distortion of consumer decisions and production levels.
The various elements of the protective regime affect domestic assembly
operations in different, and potentially contradictory, ways.  Higher finished
vehicle prices encourage greater output from e'mestic assembly operations, but
on the other hand the domestic content and compensatory export requirements
for  kits and the tariff on kits discourage domestic assembly activity by
increasing input costs.  On balance the net effect could either discourage or
encourage domestic assembly operations, depending upon the net impact of the
regulations.  In the case of Uruguay, the protective regime appears to20
encourage domestic assembly, so part of the consumer loss from  higher prices
represents  a transfer  to the  assembly  industry,  and  part  represents  an
efficiency  loss  due  to increased  domestic  assembly  of vehicles  at a  higher
cost  than  the  price  of assembled  vehicles  in the  world  market.
The  domestic  components  producers  are  unambiguouly  helped  by all  of the
elements  of the  protective  regime. The tariff  on  kits  provides  them  with
protection  from  imported  components,  the  tariff  on assembled  vehicles  helps
maintain  domestic  assembly  operations  and the  domestic  demand  for  components,
the  domestic  content  requirements  force  domestic  assembly  operations  to use
domestically  produced  components,  and  the  compensatory  export  requirements  for
the  importation  of both  finished  vehicles  and  kits increase  the  demand  for
domestically  produced  components  for  export. The  compensatory  export
requirements  in fact  act  like  an export  subsidy  to the  components  industry.
All the  elements  of the  pro-ective  regime  act  to increase  the  demand  for
components  produced  within  the  country  and  drive  up both  price  and  output  in
the  market  for  domestic  components.  Part  of the  consumer  loss  from  higher
finished  vehicle  prices  thus  takes  the  form  of a transfer  to  domestic
components  manufacturers,  and  part  represents  an efficiency  loss  corresponding
to the  extra  cost  of  producing  components  within  the  country  that  could  be
obtained  at lower  cost  in the  world  market.
Preliminary  estimates  of the  magnitude  of these  effects  indicate  that
the  protective  regime  imposes  a loss  on Uruguayan  consumers  of automobiles  of
from  70  to 80 million  US dollars  per  year,  while  transferring  from  36 to  44
million  US dollars  to domestic  assembly  operations  and  components
manufacturers.  The estimated  net  loss  to the  country  ranges  from  about  17 to
35  US million  dollars  per  year.  These  estimates  must  be considered  tentative21
because  the  model  assumes  a competitive  industry,  does  not include  some
aspects  of the  protective  regime,  does  not  consider  the  differentiated  nature
of both  autos  and  components,  and  are  biased  by trade  distortions  arising  from
the  preferential  bilateral  arrangements  with  Brazil  and  Argentina.
Despite  these  caveats,  the  results  indicate  that  the  protective  regime
imposes  substantial  costs  on consumers  and  encourages  the  allocation  of
resources  in  activities  that  are  relatively  high-cost. Given  the  costs  and
transfers  invol-ed,  a reasonable  ccurse  of action  would  be to  eliminate  the
restrictions.  Given  that  the  industry  has  been  protectpd  for  decades,
eliminating  the  system  overnight  may lead  to adjustment  problems. Such  a.
drastic  step  is  not  necessary,  however,  because  the  structure  of the  system
lends  itself  to  gradual  liberalization.  The  major  parameters  of the  system,
specifically  the  percentage  of  domestic  content  required,  the  percentage  of
compensatory  exports  required  for  kits  and  finished  vehicles,  and  the  tariff
rates  for  kits  and  finished  vehicles  could  be lowered  in stages  according  to a
preannounced  schedule  to  allow  gradual  adjustment." During  the  process  of
liberalization  care  should  be taken  not  to inadvertently  increase  the  degree
of effective  protection  to the  assembly  industry  by,  for  example,  phasing  out
domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  on kits  faster  than
those  on finished  autos. Doing  so  could  temporarily  increase  the  costs  of
protection  and  provide  false  signals  to  domestic  industry  concerning  the
direction  of adjustment  by temporarily  further  encouraging  domestic  assembly
operations.22
EN  DN'OTES
1.  See  Lloyd  (1973)  and  Munk (1969)  for  a description  of the  Australian  and
Latin  American  cases.
2.  For  a description  of the  Brazilian  export  promotion  plan  see  Mericle
(1984,  pp. 29-32). Argentinean  tax  rebates  are  described  in  Jenkins
(1985,  p. 59).
3.  See  Jenkins  (1985),  p. 61.
4.  See  Bennett  and  Sharpe  (1985)  for  a detailed  description  of the  evolution
of the  Mexican  motor  vehicle  industry  protective  regime.
5.  For  a detailed  description  of the  Uruguayan  protective  regime  and its
administration,  see  Trade  Policy  Division,  Country  Economics  Department,
The  World  Bank (1990),  Chapter  7.
6.  The  assumption  of competition  in  the  automobile  industry  is  unrealistic
for  Uruguay,  as it  probably  is  for  most  developing  countries. In 1989
there  were  about  10  motor  vehicle  assembly  firms,  two  of  which  each
accounted  for  about  1/3  of the  domestic  market. The  model  in  this  paper
is intended  to clarify  the  protective  effects  of and  interactions
between  the  domestic  content  and  compensatory  export  requirements  and
provide  rough  estimates  of the  order  of  magnitude  of the  potential  costs
oL  the  protective  regime. Future  work to take  into  account  strategic
interactions  among  firms  could  provide  a  richer  analysis  and  possibly
more  accurate  estimates  of the  true  costs.
7.  This  approach  is  similar  to  Grossman  (1981)  in that  it  assumes  that
domestic  and imported  components  are  perfect  substitutes.  Mussa (1984)
develops  a model  in  which  domestic  and  imported  inputs  are  less  than
perfpctly  substitutable.
8.  Grossman  (1981)  shows  that  the  domestic  content  requirements  will  have
different  effects  if  defined  in  terms  of  physical  quantities  or value-
added. The  Uruguayan  domestic  content  restriction  is  similar  to  a
restriction  in  quantity  terms  because  it  uses  set  valuations,  by weight,
for  the  components. If Pe'  is the  set  valuation,  by weight,  for  the
component  of  weight  wc,  P,'  is the  set  valuation,  by weight,  for  an
assembled  vehicle  of  weight  w,,  and  6' the  required  ratio  of the  value
of domestic  components  to the  value  of  output,  then  the  demand  for
components  to be incorporated  in  domestically  assembled  vehicles
(equivalent  to  a6Q,  in the  text)  would  equal  (P2wd/Pc'wc)6VQA.23
9.  Domestic  content  requirements  are  calculated  using  the  weight  of the
components  and  officially  determined  prices,  or "aforos"  for  the  various
types  of components.  This  method  implies  that  higher  domestic  component
prices  will  not  affect  the  quantity  of domestic  components  demanded,  so,
given  QA,  the  demand  curve  for  components  to  be combined  with  kits  will
be vertical. The  use  of the  system  of  aroros  avoids  the  situation  in
which  higher  domestic  component  prices  increases  the  value-added
domestically  and  thus  decreases  the  quantity  of components  necessary  to
fulfill  the  requirement.
10.  area  vwfh  - x,((PC-Pc*)/Pc)P,*MA*
- DXt(Pc-Pc*)  - area  pqrs
11.  area  zyln  - (a 6(Pc-Pc*)  + a(l- 6)x(Pc-Pc*)(Pc*/Pc))QA
- (PC-PC*)  (a6QA  +  a(l-6)XfQA(Pc*/Pc))
- ou(op)
12.  It is interesting  to note  that  the  subsidy  element  to components  exports
was  at times  explicitly  recognized  by  multinational  firms. Bennett  and
Sharpe  (1985,  p. 186)  report  that  Chrysler  arranged  for  its  Mexican
assembly  operations  to transfer  funds  to its  U.S.  assembly  operation  to
cover  the  extra  cost  of  Mexican  parts.
13.  See  Sevel  Uruguay  S.  A., "La  Industria  Automotriz  en  Uruguay  (September,
1989).
14.  Data  on the  actual  mix  of  compensatory  export  and  domestic  content
requirements  are  available  for  two  firms  representing  approximately  27
percent  of the  market  in terms  of the  number  of vehicles  assembled  in
1989. Compensatory  exports  averaged  53 percent  of kit  imports  and
dometic  content  averaged  23.5  percent.
15.  The internal  tax  on kits  is included  in  the  calculation  of the  price-
increasing  effect  of  the  tariff  on kits  because  it  directly  effects
assembly  industry  costs  and  thus  supply. In this  model  the  degree  of
protection  to  components  manufacturers  is  measured  by -he  premium  on
export  invoices,  which  is assumed  to  measure  the  percentage  difference
between  domestic  and  world  market  prices  for  components.
16. Another  observation  is  that  some  of the  costs  of the  Uruguayan  automotive
protective  regime  are  being  paid  by users  of  components  in  Brazil  and
Argentina,  who  are  paying  higher  prices  for  Uruguayan  components  than
those  components  would  cost  at  world  market  prices  and  by the  Brazilian
and  Argentine  governments  in the  form  of foregone  tariff  revenue.
17.  The  more  detailed  provisions  of the  protective  regime  that  specify  that
certain  components  must  be imported  as separate  items  could  be
eliminated  immediately,  or if this  were  considered  too  drastic,  also
phased  out  over  time  by eliminating  components  from  the  list  item  by
item.24
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TABLE I
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY PROTECTION IN URUGUAY
Gains and Losses from Protective Regime (1989)
(Millions  (, US$)
Assumed Parameters
Premium on domestic
Components (X)  =-0.08  r-0.08  r0.08
Auto Demand Elasticity (t)  ?7D-1  tX-O.5  ?1iJA
1
Supply  I Assembly (cSA)  fE-Sl  fSA-l  f5A-2
Elasticity I  Components(ecc)  esc-l  eSC-l  esc- 2
Consumer Loss  79.9  70.5  79.9
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(qrt)
Total Transfer  44.3  44.3  36.1
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